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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SANFORD E. GAINES*
INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, the National Security Strategy of the United
States observed:
Not all security risks are... [immediate or] military
in nature. Transnational phenomena such as terror-
ism, narcotics trafficking, environmental degrada-
tion, natural resource depletion, rapid population
growth and refugee flows also have security implica-
tions for both present and long term American policy.
In addition, an emerging class of transnational
environmental issues are increasingly affecting
international stability and consequently will present
new challenges to U.S. strategy.'
By officially linking environmental issues and terrorism
with national security, the 1994-1995 National Security Strategy
was drawing on a then-growing body of environmental security
analysis.2 One of the leading analysts of this school, Canadian
scholar Thomas Homer-Dixon, emphasized the increasing scarcity
of renewable resources such as cropland, fresh water, and forests
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston Law Center. My thanks to
the library staff of Lewis & Clark Law School (where I was a visiting professor
in 2004-05) for assistance in tracking down non-legal books and arranging for
their loan.
'President William J. Clinton, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT
AND ENLARGEMENT (Feb. 1995), at 1, available at http://webharvest.gov/peth04/
20041029025809/www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research-pubs/nss.pdf (last visited
Jan. 21, 2006).
2 See id. at 133-34.
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that are required to meet the needs of growing populations as the
critical factor connecting environmental and security concerns:
This environmental scarcity helps generate chronic,
diffuse, subnational violence-exactly the kind of
violence that bedevils conventional military institu-
tions. Around the world, we see conventional armies
pinned down and often utterly impotent in the face of
interethnic violence or attacks by ragtag bands of
lightly armed guerillas and insurgents. As yet,
environmental scarcity is not a major factor behind
most of these conflicts, but we can expect it to become
a more important influence in coming decades be-
cause of larger populations and higher per capita
resource consumption rates.3
I will call the three-step logical chain of causation behind
Homer-Dixon's analysis the "standard model" of environmental
security studies. In this model, environmental degradation, com-
bined with overpopulation in foreign countries, deepens poverty and
engenders civil and ethnic strife over access to increasingly scarce
resources.4 Poverty and civil strife in turn lead to political instability
and the migration of "environmental refugees."5 Instability and
migration in developing countries set the stage for armed civil and
inter-ethnic conflict, posing tangible threats to the national security
of developed countries such as the United States.6 Homer-Dixon was
candid about his narrow focus at the time, arguing that "'environ-
mental security' encompasses an almost unmanageable array of
sub-issues," especially if security is broadly defined.7 To limit his
research and analysis to a manageable scale, Homer-Dixon focused
3 THOMAS F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE 13
(Princeton U. Press 1999) [hereinafter VIOLENCE].
4 See id. at 12.
5 See id. at 16.
6 See id. at 12.
7 Id. at3.
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exclusively on one aspect of the problem: "conflict," specifically
"violent... conflict."
8
The narrow range of issues considered by Homer-Dixon
and other writers who contributed to the standard environmental
security literature of the 1990s left gaps too large for their
conclusions to continue to be persuasive. Even at the time, other
analysts questioned whether the fundamental source of civil
and ethnic violence really is a competition for access to scarce
resources, noting the frequent instances of ethnic or civil struggle
for control over abundant resources of high value.9 In the post-
9/11 world, moreover, the tendency toward a singular focus on
environmental scarcity as a source of conflict leaves us without
a satisfactory explanation for radical Islamic terrorism, which
has roots in the educated classes of the Arab world and little
apparent relationship to (or interest in) the politics of scarcity
and environmental degradation. 10
Happily, the student editors who conceived the 2005
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
symposium, "Global Terrorism and Its Impact on Sustainable
Development: Exploring the Linkages Between Sustainable
Development, Security and Terrorism," framed the question in
terms of sustainable development. This article builds on the
premise that the substitution of the broad term "sustainable
development" for the simpler term "environment" in the field of
environmental security is deeply significant because "sustainable
8 See id.
9 Compare VIOLENCE, supra note 3 with Michael Watts, Petro-Violence:
Community, Extraction, and Political Ecology of a Mythic Commodity, in
VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS 189, 189-91 (Nancy Lee Peluso & Michael Watts eds.,
Cornell U. Press 2001) (discussing violence in Nigeria, Ecuador, Kazakstan and
other oil-rich countries) [hereinafter VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS]; and Susan C.
Stonich & Peter Vandergeest, Violence, Environment, and Industrial Shrimp
Farming, in VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS 261 (describing violent conflict in Thailand
over coastal mangrove swamps as lucrative shrimp farming locations).
'0 But see Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality, 9
ECSP REP. 27, 34 (2003) (asserting a link between economic failure-including
environmental degradation-and state failure, which in turn leads to terrorism).
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development" reincorporates multiple social, economic, and
political factors shaping environmental conditions and environ-
mental governance, which were missing from the simplified
analysis of environmental scarcity and violent conflict. The social
and economic dimensions of sustainable development also invite
a broader conception of "security." Exploring security linkages in
the sustainable development frame of reference thus opens our
minds to broader, more complex, and ultimately more meaningful
connections between personal security and the patterns of
economic activity and social organization that affect human use
and abuse of the environment. The time is right to go beyond
Homer-Dixon's "violent conflict" conception and embrace the
analytically "unmanageable array of sub-issues" he sidestepped.11
This will evoke conceptually powerful notions of human security
relevant to nations and peoples.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the standard model of
early environmental security studies. In the process, it shows why
that discourse is unpersuasive about the environment-security
linkage, necessitating new ways of conceptualizing the relation-
ship. Part II develops definitions of the two elements to be
linked: "sustainable development" and "security." Sustainable
development has social and economic elements that make it a more
complex-but more powerful-explanatory concept, reaching
beyond the simple analysis of environmental resources and
conditions that typify the environmental security literature. With
the social and economic elements of sustainable development in
mind, security is appropriately broadened to embrace much more
than the traditional state-centered and fundamentally military
issues often associated with "national security." Using these broad
definitions of sustainable development and security, Part III
argues that there are meaningful, indeed critical, linkages between
sustainable development and security, emphasizing the under-
appreciated role of unsustainable patterns of consumption in
the developed world in contributing to our increasing insecurity.
Part III also draws normative conclusions about how the public
11 VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 3.
324
2006] SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT & NATIONAL SECURITY 325
policies of the United States, both domestic and foreign, need
radical reform in order to obtain the security benefits of a full
commitment to sustainable development.
I. ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN THE STANDARD MODEL
In the 1980s, emerging patterns in world affairs drew
attention to the possible connection between environmental
conditions and national security. On the security side, the military
establishment of the developed world (which for decades had
focused on the strategic East-West struggle for world domination
between free market democracy and communism) was beginning
to confront the diffuse security challenges of a world increasingly
divided between North and South, from famine (Somalia), ethnic
warfare (Sudan, Rwanda, and Yugoslavia), low-level insurgencies
(Central America), border conflicts (Ethiopia and Somalia), and
large movements of people across borders as refugees or economic
migrants.12 Concurrently, deeper scientific understanding and the
accelerating pace of environmental change brought to public
attention the vulnerability of even the more industrialized and
developed countries to deterioration in environmental conditions. 13
Desertification, stratospheric ozone depletion, declines in fisheries,
species extinction, tropical deforestation, and climate change filled
an exploding agenda of international environmental challenges 4
while HIV/AIDS forcibly demonstrated the susceptibility of
populations everywhere to pandemic disease. Part I.A. reviews the
12 A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1. President Clinton's Strategy
mentions most of these areas of tension or conflict, and identifies a role for the
United States to "encourage peaceful resolution of internal disputes" and to
engage in "humanitarian intervention." Id. at 31-32.
13 Symbolic of the new awareness was Time magazine's choice of the
"Endangered Earth" as the "Planet of the Year" for 1988. TIME, Jan. 2, 1989,
cover.14 Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law: Rethinking the
Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENVTL L. (2001-02), available at http://www.vjel.
org/articles/articles/ramlogan.html (tabulating 107 multilateral environmental
agreements during the 1970s and 113 during the 1980s). Id. at n.28.
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standard model environmental security literature that emerged in
the 1980s and blossomed in the 1990s.
The standard environmental security model, however, did
not go unchallenged. One line of criticism came from orthodox or
neoconservative theorists;15 another from internationalists; 6 and
a third from left-leaning social and political scientists. 7 Part I.B.
examines these criticisms.
A. The Early Environmental Security Model
As with any endeavor to reach a new understanding of the
world, hindsight enables us to recognize forerunners who identified
the major themes well before others began to build up a scholarly
or popular literature on those themes. In environmental security
studies, two forerunners from 1980 stand out: the Global 2000
Report to the President, prepared by government agencies at the
request of Jimmy Carter;' and the Report of the Brandt Commis-
sion on International Development Issues. 9 Global 2000, encyclo-
pedic in scope, made predictions about such core environmental
factors as population growth, deforestation, desertification, and
15 See, e.g., YAHYA SADOWSKI, THE MYTH OF GLOBAL CHAOS (1998) [hereinafter
GLOBAL CHAOS].16 Eric K. Stern, The Case for Comprehensive Security, in CONTESTED GROUNDS:
SECURITY AND CONFLICT IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 127, 138-40
(Daniel H. Deudney & Richard A. Matthew eds., SUNY Press 1999) [hereinafter
CONTESTED GROUNDS] (discussing the globalist critique of comprehensive
security).
17 Nancy Lee Peluso & Michael Watts, Introduction to VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS,
supra note 9, at 5 (emphasizing the "political economy of access to and control
over resources"); see also Richard Matthew, Mark Halle & Jason Spitzer,
Introduction to CONSERVING THE PEACE: RESOURCES, LIVELIHOODS AND SECURITY
1, 10 (Richard Matthew, Mark Halle & Jason Spitzer eds., International
Institute for Sustainable Development 2002), available at http://www.iisd.org/
pdf12002/envsec-conserving-peace.pdf [hereinafter CONSERVING THE PEACE].
18 U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY AND U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE GLOBAL 2000
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT-ENTERING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1980)
[hereinafter GLOBAL 2000].
'9 WILLY BRANDT ET AL., NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL (1980).
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species loss-all of which have proven to be remarkably accurate.20
It was also the first major study to identify climate change as an
aspect of environmental change with profound ecological and social
implications. 21 Noting that these environmental threats "are
inextricably linked to some of the most perplexing and persistent
problems in the world-poverty, injustice, and social conflict,"22 the
report pointed to the need for new initiatives "if worsening poverty
and human suffering, environmental degradation, and interna-
tional tension and conflicts are to be prevented."23
At the same time, the Brandt Commission, focusing on the
North-South issue of development, foresaw the possibility of
"chaos" due to "mass hunger, economic disaster, environmental
catastrophes and terrorism" and urged thinking beyond the
"traditional threats to peace."24 Later in the 1980s, other environ-
mental writers explored similar connections-for example, the
link between environmental degradation and civil wars and
insurgencies in Central America.25
In the late 1980s, just as the security landscape was
undergoing a major transformation, global environmentalism
emerged as a major policy consideration. Many new international
environmental agreements were negotiated on issues ranging from
hazardous waste management to conservation of biodiversity.26
20 See JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKYAT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 6-7 (2004). Professor Speth was one of the principal
authors of GLOBAL 2000.
21 Id. at 7-8.
22 GLOBAL 2000, supra note 18, at 4.
23 Id.
24 BRANDT, supra note 19, at 13, (quoted in SPETH, RED SKY, supra note 20, at 8).
25 See, e.g., NORMAN MYERS, NOT FAR AFIELD: U.S. INTERESTS AND THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT (1987); JANET WELSH BROWN, IN THE U.S. INTEREST: RESOURCES,
GROWTH, AND SECURITY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1990).26Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and Their
Disposal, concluded Mar. 22, 1989,28 I.L.M. 657; Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550; Convention
on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, concluded June 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 859; Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, adopted Sept. 10, 1991,30 I.L.M. 800 (Espoo Convention);
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL"Y REV. [Vol. 30:321
The World Commission on Environment and Development produced
a powerful report that linked economic development, economic
equity, and alleviation of poverty with environmental protection.
Meanwhile, the Communist Bloc unraveled in the autumn of 1989
and the Soviet Union itself dissolved into independent states soon
thereafter, thus removing the enemy that had preoccupied North
American and European security analysts for more than forty
years. In response to these developments, the field of environmental
security studies began to take shape.
Popular writers seized on these new ideas, publicizing in
particular a simple environmental security model which empha-
sized resource degradation and population growth in developing
countries. The popular literature is famously represented by
journalist Robert Kaplan's 1994 article, The Coming Anarchy, in
which he declared boldly that "[it is time to understand The
Environment [sic] for what it is: the national-security issue of the
early twenty-first century."
29
On a less polemic level, noted environmental commentator
Jessica Tuchman Mathews wrote an article in Foreign Affairs,
which brought the environmental security viewpoint directly to the
attention of the foreign policy establishment.3 This 1989 article,
along with the work of many other environmental security
scholars,3 began to have significant influence at the highest policy
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, concluded May 9,
1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992); Convention on Biological
Diversity, concluded June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).2 7 WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 1, 1-23 (Oxford U.
Press, 1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
28 For a short history of environment and security studies, see CONSERVING THE
PEACE, supra note 17, at 7-12.
29 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime,
Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social
Fabric of Our Planet, 273 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 44, 58 (1994).
Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162(1989).
3' In addition to the work of the Toronto Group under Homer-Dixon, another
comprehensive research project was conducted in Switzerland under the title
"Environment and Conflicts Project" ("ENCOP"). See ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION AS A CAUSE OF WAR (Ginther Baichler et al. eds., 1996).
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levels with the United States and its security allies in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") in the early 1990s.32 Foreign
and defense policy makers were receptive to these new ideas be-
cause other political and social currents of the day were leading to
a thorough reconsideration of the key elements of national security
strategy. In particular, the environmental explanation for growing
conflict dovetailed with the contemporary popularity of "global
chaos theory,"33 which, after the demise of communism, gave the
military defense establishment fresh justifications for maintaining
a state of readiness against foreign threats.'
Although environmental issues were mentioned specifically
in the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States,35 it
was not until President Clinton came into office in 1993 that
environmental security thinking was fully incorporated into
national security policy. The Clinton Administration promptly
created the post of deputy undersecretary of defense for environ-
mental security and reorganized the National Security Council to
include an office of environmental affairs.36
32 The NATO work, done through its Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society, is described in NATO, ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (Kurt M. Leitzmann & Gary D. Vest eds., 1999).
" "Global Chaos Theory" viewed ethnic and religious conflicts and clashes of
culture emerging as the major threats to national security. The theory is
summarized in GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 15, at 15-19.
" See, e.g., GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 15, at 69-72 (explaining the ethnic
conflicts predicted by global chaos theorists such as Samuel Huntington and the
"ecological version" of global chaos theory that emerged strongly in the State
Department during the Clinton Administration).
3 5 NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 1991), http://www.fas.
org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm.
36 For a good brief review of these early official developments, see Kent Hughes
Butts, The Case for DOD Involvement in Environmental Security, in CONTESTED
GROUNDS, supra note 16, at 109-11. It is interesting to note that the
environment virtually has disappeared in the most recent (2002) version of the
National Security Strategy; the only reference to it is in connection with free
trade. The 2002 strategy gives some attention to the security value of economic
development for developing countries and to conflicts over resources in Africa,
but environmental conditions are not specifically mentioned in those contexts.
George W. Bush, THE NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 19
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The basic thesis of environmental security analysis in the
1990s is best presented in Thomas Homer-Dixon's37 comprehensive
and intellectually rigorous book Environment, Scarcity, and
Violence.3" Homer-Dixon's own research and thinking about the
sources of violence and insecurity has since evolved beyond his
early emphasis on environmental conditions.39 Nevertheless, his
book offers a sophisticated model that captures many of the ideas
propounded in the broader traditional literature.
At the outset of Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Homer-
Dixon deliberately rejects a broad interpretation of security.4" He
even argues that patterns of conflict entail too vast a topic for
rigorous study; therefore he narrows his focus to violent conflict.41
His book, then, examines "how environmental stress affects violent
national and international conflict." 2 Homer-Dixon begins his
analysis with the axiom that human societies are dependent for their
survival on natural resources.' He notes that the poorer half of the
human population is particularly dependent on renewable natural
resources for food, fuel, and shelter. Homer-Dixon then posits that
resource scarcity is "an omnipresent feature of our existence."
(2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L
SECURITY STRATEGY 2002].
37 Homer-Dixon directs a peace and conflict studies program at the University of
Toronto. He began publishing articles on environmental security as early as 1991.
38 See VIOLENCE, supra note 3; see also ECOVIOLENCE: LINKS AMONG
ENVIRONMENT, POPULATION, AND SECURITY (Thomas F. Homer-Dixon & Jessica
Blitt eds., 1998) [hereinafter ECOVIOLENCE].39 THOMAS F. HOMER-DIXON, THE INGENUITY GAP 21 (2000) ("But once I was deep
into the issue, I found that environmental problems cannot, by themselves,
cause violence. They must combine with other factors, usually the failure of
economic institutions or government.") [hereafter THE INGENUITY GAP].
40 See VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 3. I will return to this issue in Part II; it marks
one disagreement I have with this analysis.
41 Id.
42Id.
43 Id. at 3-7.
Id. at 13. The policy relevance of this essential truth is expressed most recently
in the framework for assessment of the UN-sponsored MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT. See MILLENNIUM ECOsYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN
WELL-BEING: FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT 71-84 (2003).
4 5 VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 47.
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Homer-Dixon identifies three ways that resource scarcity
can arise: (1) reduced supply, (2) increased demand, or (3) change in
relative access by different groups.46 He describes supply-induced
scarcity as the result of a combination of population growth, use of
technology, and per capita consumption outstripping (or degrading)
the available resource supply.4v Demand-induced scarcity is also
directly attributable to increases in population and per capita
consumption rates.4 8 Thus, population growth figures heavily in
Homer-Dixon's analysis, though he expends considerable effort to
distinguish his overall analysis from the neo-Malthusian school
associated with such commentators as Paul Ehrlich.49 Homer-
Dixon's third cause of scarcity occurs when social structures limit
the poor's access to otherwise sufficient environmental resources.5"
He posits that access-related scarcity usually interacts with supply
or demand scarcities, leading one social group to capture a
resource or to marginalize another group ecologically by forcing
them to use degraded or deficient resources.5 ' Access to croplands
exemplify this type of scarcity, with some groups in a particular
society controlling the croplands with the best soil and water,
forcing others to migrate to marginally productive lands."
46 Id. at 48.
4 7 This aspect of the analysis is known widely in the environmental literature as
the 'IPAT' formula, holding that environmental impact (I) is the product of
population (P), per capita consumption as indicated by affluence (A), and the
technologies employed to produce the goods being consumed (T). Even if
population and consumption increase, the overall environmental impact can be
reduced with the use of better technologies. The promise of technology, or what
Homer-Dixon more broadly terms ingenuity, is the basic argument of his most
recent book. See THE INGENUITY GAP, supra note 39, at 3-4; see also VIOLENCE,
supra note 3, at 49.
48 See VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 51.
49 See PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968) (arguing that explosive
world population growth was placing such demands on environmental resources
that we would reach a crisis by the end of the twentieth century).
5 0 VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 48.
51 Id. at 76-77.
52 See id.
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The next step in Homer-Dixon's logic is that environ-
mental scarcity "often acts as a deep, underlying stressor of social
systems, 53 inducing social change. He identifies five critical social
changes: (1) constraints on agricultural productivity, which affect
health and welfare; (2) constraints on economic productivity, which
also affect well-being; (3) migration; (4) social segmentation; and
(5) disruption of social institutions.54 The final step in his analysis
asserts that scarcity-induced social changes lead to violent
conflict.55 Homer-Dixon emphasizes three forms of violence in
his model: (1) simple scarcity conflicts (resource wars, such as
over access to a fishery); (2) group identity conflicts (brought on
by migration and social segmentation); and (3) insurgencies
(arising most often out of some combination of segmentation and
weakening of social institutions).5 6 Homer-Dixon argues that inter-
state resource wars are unlikely, but that group identity conflicts
and insurgency are "important both in terms of their probable
frequency in the future (which will rise ... as scarcities worsen in
some parts of the world) and their policy implications.""
B. Criticisms of the Traditional Environmental Security
Model
The environmental scarcity model propounded by Homer-
Dixon and others did not go unchallenged. Three lines of criticism
53 Id. at 81.
54 Id. at 80-103.
" See id. at 80.56 Id. at 137.
57 Id. at 5. But for an anecdotal example of how such conflicts can flare up, recall
the Canadian Navy's seizure of a Spanish fishing vessel near the Newfoundland
Grand Banks in 1995. Bryan McDonald & Ted Gaulin, Environmental Change,
Conflict, and Adaptation: Evidence from Cases (2002), http://www.gechs.uci.edu/
McDonaldGaulinISA2002.pdf (discussing the prelude to and the aftermath of the
so-called Turbot War). A current inter-nation tension point over resources is the
Chinese deployment of naval vessels in the East China Sea as part of a dispute
between China and Japan over ownership of seabed oil and natural gas
resources in the area. Norimitsu Onshi & Howard W. French, Japan's Rivalry
with China is Stirring a Crowded Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A4.58 VIOLENCE, supra note 3, at 147.
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quickly appeared in the writings of scholars and policy analysts.
One commentator has styled these respectively as orthodox,
globalist, and reformist criticisms.59 The orthodox critics are
national security traditionalists who view environmental security
issues as a distraction from military preparedness." The globalist
critics voice concern that making the environment a national
security issue will foment nationalism and undermine international
cooperation.6 The reformist critics question the environmental
determinism of the environmental security literature, arguing that
political and social inequities are more fundamental to the rise in
violent conflict.62 The apparent failure of the environmental scarcity
model to anticipate or explain the types of violence and security
threats that have emerged in the early years of the twenty-first
century now must be added to these contemporaneous criticisms.
Orthodox and neoconservative theorists criticized the
environmental scarcity model as part of their broader resistance to
the attention given to the global chaos of subnational ethnic,
nationalist, or secessionist violence as a primary security issue.63
One analyst acidly suggests that ecological security thinking
"cannibalized" global chaos theory and used it to influence security
policy.' He writes scornfully that President Clinton's first
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, "had become a fervent
convert to the environmental perspective ... ."65 This critic also
noted that Clinton himself had become enamored of global chaos
theory, both in general and in the environmental version of it
publicized in Robert Kaplan's Atlantic Monthly article.66 Clinton
" Stern, The Case for Comprehensive Security, in CONTESTED GROUNDS, supra
note 16, at 134-42.
60 Id. at 134-38.
61 Id. at 138-40.
62 See, e.g., Nancy Peluso & Michael Watts, Violent Environments: Responses, 9
ECSP REP. 93 (2003) (arguing that the study of cases of violence "should begin
with the precise and changing relations between political economy and
mechanisms of access, control, and struggle over environmental resources").
63 See, e.g., GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 15.
64 Id. at 71.
65 Id.
66 Kaplan, supra note 29; see also GLOBAL CHAOS, supra note 15, at 72.
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used a commencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy to warn
of "a new world threatened with instability, even abject chaos...
aggravated by environmental disaster, by abject hunger by mass
migrations." 7 The core of the criticism from this quarter lies in
conservatives' belief that a sound national security policy requires
a coherent view of national security needs-a "grand strategy"-and
that the world view propounded by global chaos theorists of various
persuasions lacked such a unifying vision.' According to Sadowski,
the result was a foreign policy that "tended to be cautious, reactive
rather than proactive, or outright waffling."69
Another challenge to traditional environmental security
analysis comes from globalists, who are concerned that the security
focus of the theory appeals to nationalist self-interest and, thus,
undermines a global approach to environmental protection.7 ° One
analyst of this school agrees with Homer-Dixon that "environ-
mental degradation is not very likely to cause interstate wars," but
uses this conclusion to argue against defining the environment as
a national security issue." Simon Dalby, a frequent writer on this
topic, expresses a broader concern that, if the United States makes
international environmental affairs into a national security issue,
it could lead to hegemonic co-optation of environmental policy, and
that environmental controls would become an instrument by which
developed countries could maintain post-colonial domination of
developing countries.72 Part II, below, develops another part of
Dalby's critique.
Yet another group of critics of the environmental security
literature comprises mostly social and political scientists, who
articulate two main problems. These critics do not deny that
environmental degradation contributes to poverty and conflict, but
67 Id. (quoting President Clinton).
68 Id. at 73.
69 id.
70 See CONTESTED GROUNDS, supra note 16, at 138-40.
71 Daniel H. Deudney, Environmental Security: A Critique, in CONTESTED
GROUNDS, supra note 16, at 187, 190.
72 Simon Dalby, Threats from the South?: Geopolitics, Equity, and Environmental
Security, in CONTESTED GROUNDS, supra note 16, at 155, 163, 169.
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they find that Homer-Dixon's emphasis on environmental factors
and population growth ignores the socio-political root causes of
violence.73 According to these critics, scarcity of resources arises
out of the relations of political economy with mechanisms of access,
control, and struggle over resources.74 Indeed, some sociologists
and political scientists believe the evidence shows that resource
abundance has closer ties to environmentally-related violence than
scarcity.75 Therefore, they consider inequitable access to resources
and political oppression, rather than environmental scarcity, to be
the primary driver of conflict. The reformists also worry about the
association that arises between environmental security scholarship
and the military security establishment.7 6
Deep and complex interactions among social and economic
conditions, politics, and environmental degradation have in fact
marked the evolution of both domestic and international environ-
mental policy. The internationalist and reformist criticisms of an
over-deterministic emphasis on environmental scarcity as a root
cause of social violence thus have merit. In response to this criti-
cism, environmental security analysts themselves have softened
their deterministic tone. Homer-Dixon, for example, has moved
away from his singular focus on environmental scarcity toward a
broader, more nuanced, view of the challenges facing developing
" Nancy Peluso & Michael Watts, Violent Environments: Responses, 9 ECSP
REP. at 93 (2003), http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/exchange.pdf (arguing that
Homer-Dixon's notion of scarcity is bereft of social specificity and that inspection
of cases of violence necessitates a discussion of political economy) [hereinafter
Peluso & Watts, Responses].
74 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the
Literature, 35 J. PEACE RES. 381 (1998); Nancy Lee Peluso & Michael Watts,
Violent Environments, in VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 9, at 3, 5
(emphasizing the "political economy of access to and control over resources").
" Indra de Soysa, The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or
Paucity?, in GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS 113
(Mats Berdal & David M. Malone eds., 2000) (arguing that struggles for control
of the wealth from abundant resources are a greater source of conflict than
struggles over access to scarce resources).
76 Peluso & Watts, Responses, supra note 73, at 94.
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countries that includes social and political failures.77 In a similar
vein, Jared Diamond,78 another writer occasionally accused of
giving undue weight to strictly environmental factors,79 describes
environmentally-challenged societies that have succeeded in
achieving sustainability and takes pains to point out that, far from
being environmentally determinist, his book demonstrates that
"while environmental conditions certainly make it more difficult to
support human societies in some environments than in others, that
still leaves much scope for a society to save or doom itself by its
own actions."8
From a twenty-first century perspective, the simple
environmental scarcity model of threats to the national security of
the United States or other industrial powers seems deficient for
other reasons. First, most of the conflict and violence in the world
at present does not directly threaten the national security of the
United States or other developed countries. Sudan, Rwanda, the
Congo, Nepal, the Philippines, Colombia, and Bolivia all are recent
examples of group identity conflict, active insurgency, or both.
Some of this violence has roots in deepening patterns of environ-
mental scarcity and internal conflict over resources. Diamond, for
example, attributes the 1994 violence in Rwanda to a combination
of overpopulation and inequitable access to sufficient land to feed
families and provide an income, in spite of fertile soils and
favorable climate conditions for crops.8 Yet, the developed world
" See supra note 39.
78 JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED
(2005) [hereinafter COLLAPSE].
71 See Gregg Easterbrook, There Goes the Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday,
Jan. 30, 2005, at 10-11 (reviewing COLLAPSE, supra note 78; accusing Diamond
of generalizing from "environmental failures on isolated islands to
environmental threats to society as a whole," and failing to consider "society's
evolutionary arc").
80 COLLAPSE, supra note 78, at 438.
81 Id. at 311-28. Homer-Dixon, interestingly, finds such a perspective too
superficial and environmental scarcity peripheral, emphasizing instead political
factors such as the insecurity of the elite and the regime. Valerie Percival &
Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Case of Rwanda, in ECOVIOLENCE, supra note 38, at
201. For a first-person perspective reflecting a blend of these views, see SPETH,
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scarcely can stir itself to care about these distant disturbances.
They stir moral outrage and humanitarian impulses but, beyond
that, there is a palpable reluctance to commit national security
assets to their solution.82 For the United States, the exception is
Colombia, where active U.S. military and law enforcement
involvement rests on issues of continued access to oil and the
interdiction of drug trafficking. 3 However, the roots of the
Colombian conflict have little to do with Homer-Dixon's scarcity-
driven social breakdown.'
Second, the direct physical national security threat of
terrorism to the North-as happened in New York, Madrid, and
London in recent years-finds sustenance in a religious fundamen-
talism built on historical grievances, deep-rooted religious
animosities, and a clash between traditional and modern concep-
tions of the world that have little to do with environmental
degradation. Jeffrey Sachs argues that "terrorists prey on failed
states, and state failure is closely related to economic failure." 5
However, he views economic collapse and state failure as a contri-
butor to, rather than a root cause of, environmental degradation.8"
We return to poverty as an issue of independent significance in
Part II.
RED SKY IN THE MORNING, supra note 20, at 122-23 (quoting a former Rwandan
agriculture minister to the effect that environmental scarcities, which resulted
from "complex interactions between high population pressure, land shortage and
its inequitable distribution, and soil degradation," precipitated a "socio-economic
crisis that converged with the elites' power rivalry and with a high rate of rural
unemployment").82 See Nicholas Kristol, Dithering as Others Die, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,2004, at A13.
Joel Brinkley, Anti-Drug Gaines in Colombia Don't Reduce Flow to U.S., N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 28, 2005, at A3; Juan Forero, Safeguarding Colombia's Oil, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at W1.
' See generally Winifred Tate, Paramilitaries in Colombia, 8 BROWN J. WORLD
AFF. 163 (2001), available at http://www.watsoninstitute.orgbjwa/archive/8.1/
Essays/Tate.pdf.
85Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality, 9 ECSPREP.
27, 34 (2003).
86 Id. at 31.
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Third, the standard model of environmental security does
not fully account for the social, political, economic, and equitable
contexts in which conflicts engendered by environmental scarcity
play out. As one commentator has noted, "[c] onsidering conflicts to
be 'environmental' in origin can obscure the political-economic
origins of what . . . are definitively political events.""7 However,
accounting for social, political, and economic factors, and deciding
what to attribute to environmental conditions remain controversial
questions for analysts and policy makers alike. As summarized in
a recent report from the United Nations Environment Program,
"It]he relationship between environmental degradation and
political instability-whether it is insecurity or violent conflict-is
poorly understood."8 8
The rest of this article proposes one possible resolution of
the discordant themes of traditional and critical environmental
security analysts that leads to a fresh perspective on the linkage
between environment and national security. It begins by embrac-
ing sustainable development as a more revealing lens through
which to examine how environmental conditions threaten or
enhance our security. It then urges a broad conception of national
security, one that has a new emphasis on social and political
factors while diminishing concerns that the environmental
community is playing into the hands of the military 9 or that
sustainable development is in danger of being co-opted by the
security community's "practices of specifying threats and its
managerial modes for responding to dangers.""
87 James Fairhead, International Dimensions of Conflict over Natural and
Environmental Resources, in VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 9, at 213,235.
" Steve Lonergan, Introduction to UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM,
UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENT, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION 7-10 (United
Nations Environment Programme, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars 2004). The report presents the key conclusions from a conference on
Environment, Conflict, and Cooperation: Scoping Gaps and Opportunities for
Research and Policy Agendas.
89 Peluso & Watts, Responses, supra note 73, at 93-94.
90 SIMON DALBY, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY xxxii (2002).
338
2006] SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT & NATIONAL SECURITY 339
II. UNDERSTANDING "SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT" IN TERMS
OF "SECURITY"
A. The Contours of Sustainable Development
As part of the preparations for the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, the United Nations
appointed a distinguished group of business people, government
officials, and environmental experts to a World Commission on
Environment and Development ("WCED"), chaired by the Norwegian
prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland.9' The final report of the
WCED, Our Common Future, distilled the best thinking of the day
on the world's environmental condition, the challenge of economic
development for developing countries, and the connections between
the two.92 By integrating economic and social development issues
with environmental conditions and environmental protection, 9
Our Common Future brought sustainable development into the
sphere of international and national policy debate. It also set the
stage for environmental security studies by dramatizing the
WCED's prediction that "the deepening and widening environ-
mental crisis presents a threat to national security-and even
survival-that may be greater than well-armed, ill-disposed
neighbors."94 As Gro Harlem Brundtland later remarked, "[tihe
environmental problems of the poor will affect the rich as well, in
the not too distant future, transmitted through political instability
and turmoil."95
Sustainable development is a broad and ambiguous concept.
Its breadth and ambiguity are its virtues as well as its weaknesses.
Sustainable development draws strength from its integration of
91 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at xii-xv.
92 Id. at 2-3.
93 Id. at 4.94 Id. at 7.
" Steve Lonergan, Human Security, Environmental Security and Sustainable
Development, in ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY: DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES 66
(Miriam R. Lowi & Brian R. Shaw eds., 2000) (quoting Gro Harlem Brundtland).
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multiple factors affecting society, and political sustenance from its
indeterminate nature, which allows people of many different
backgrounds and perspectives to agree that sustainable develop-
ment should be embraced as a world goal. By the same token, some
have suggested that sustainable development is such a vague
concept that it is not a useful guide for determining policy,96 while
others see it as a mask for the agenda of vested economic interests,
for whom sustainable development is "about sustaining develop-
ment as economically rationalized environment rather than the
development of a sustaining ecology."9 7 Whole books have been
dedicated to elaborating workable definitions of sustainable
development in an effort to resolve its ambiguities. Rather than
engage in this definitional discourse, the purpose here is to apply
the main contours of the concept as originally presented by the
WCED in 1987. The central message of the WCED is that our
development path, to be sustainable, should "meet[] the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.""8 This definition carries within it several
key thoughts relevant to security. 99
First, there are human needs-in particular, the basic needs
of the world's poorest people for adequate food, water, and
shelter.10 The world community subsequently has developed and
embraced Millennium Development Goals to establish measurable
benchmarks on the path to eradicating the worst of the world's
poverty. 10' The world's leading economic powers, the Group of
96 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, A Term's Limits, FOREIGN POLWY, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 74.
17 DALBY, supra note 90, at xxxii (quoting Tim Luke).
9 8 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 43.
99 Id. at 291.
1o0 Id. at 54-55.
10' See generally United Nations, U.N. Millennium Development Goals, http:/l
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.asp. In September 2005, the United States
sought to distance itself from the Millennium Development Goals but ultimately
accepted a summit resolution that called for continued pursuit of those goals.
Celia W. Dugger, U.N. vs. Poverty: Seeking a Focus, Quarreling over the Vision,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A10.
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Eight, or G8, also noted the elimination of global poverty as a moral
imperative and as necessary for a stable world.° 2 Interestingly, the
latest iteration of the National Security Strategy of the United
States places fresh emphasis on global poverty reduction as an
element of security policy because of the link between poverty and
state failure.0 3 The former president of the World Bank, James
Wolfensohn, made a similar argument in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11, asserting that terrorism is the symptom, and "[tihe disease
is the discontent seething in Islam and, more generally, in the
world of the poor."1
0 4
Some analysts view these simple statements as erroneous
and possibly dangerous because they could lead to a military
response to problems requiring a more complex response. 10 5 In the
view of one, the "real political threat" is that a wide rich-poor divide
in the world community "undermines the political legitimacy of the
richer states" within a globalized world where even the richer states
must live in community with the poorer.106 Others, skeptical of a
realistic connection between poverty and national security, embrace
the goal on humanitarian grounds alone. Robert Kagan, reviewing
Robert Kaplan's book, The ComingAnarchy,1 7 dismissed Kaplan's
apocalyptic vision that the chaos and violence of West Africa
would be visited on Americans.18 Kagan concluded that "the most
powerful reason" why Westerners should care about West Africans
102 Vincent Ferraro, Globalizing Weakness: Is Global Poverty a Threat to the
Interests of States?, 9 ESCP REP. 12 (2003) (citing a "Global Poverty Report"
issued at the G8 summit in Okinawa, Japan in July, 2000); Sachs, supra note 85,
at 28 (referring to the work of the State Failure Task Force of the Central
Intelligence Agency).103 See NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY 2002, supra note 36 (declaring that "poverty,
weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist
networks ... within their borders").
104 Ferraro, supra note 102, at 17 (quoting the World Bank).105 Id. at 17.
106 Id. at 17, 18.
107 See Kaplan, supra note 29.
10' Robert Kagan, The Return of Cheap Pessimism. Inside the Limo, 222 NEW
REPUBLIC 32, 34 (2000) (book review), available at http://www.tnr.com/041000/
kagan041000.html.
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is "that they are human."109 In light of the emphasis of the George
W. Bush Administration on "public diplomacy,"11 perhaps even
Kagan's altruistic humanism dovetails with the national security
interests of the United States.
The second concept embedded in sustainable development
is intergenerational equity: the argument that the present
generation owes a duty to future generations to leave them an
environment with a sufficient variety and abundance of resources
to meet their own needs."' Intergenerational equity necessarily
implies responsibility, including the environmental responsibility
of developed countries to promote sustainable development as an
essential element of protecting their own security. It should be
noted that security, too, has an intergenerational dimension.
Security today avails little if it does not also promote security for
the indefinite future.
A third concept implicit in the sustainable approach to
meeting human development needs, intragenerational equity,
draws attention to the need for equitable access within the present
generation to resources and other development opportunities. 2
Development is not sustainable if it does not rest on a stable social
and political foundation." 3 The social and political dimensions of
sustaining ecological systems has been elaborated recently in the
work of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment." 4 Their analysis,
109 See id. at 41.
110 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2002, supra note 36, at 6.
"' OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 43, 46. For a full discussion of the
concept, see Edith Brown Weiss, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY
(Transnational Pub. 1989).
112 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 43 (noting that the concern for
intergenerational equity "must logically be extended to equity within each
generation").
113 Id. at 43-44 ("A world in which poverty and inequality are endemic will
always be prone to ecological and other crises. Sustainable development requires
meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy
their aspirations for a better life.").
114 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 96-104 (noting that
human activities, institutions, and values are "drivers" of ecosystem change,
including sociopolitical forces such as expanding public participation and
changing mechanisms of dispute resolution).
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and the concept of intragenerational equity in general, connects
directly with the reformist critique of the environmental scarcity
line of analysis, binding sustainable development and security
tightly together.
The essence of the reformist critique is that traditional
environmental security analysis views environmental conditions
as the initiator of, or a major contributing factor to, ethnic, civil, or
even international violent conflict." 5 Reformists argue that
political ecologists should seek the primary causal factors in the
social and political context within which particular people gain
access to and use or abuse environmental resources." 6 An explicit
feature of this perspective is the belief, supported by a number of
case studies, that existing inequities in social and political power
foster or perpetuate a culture of violence." 7 Steve Lonergan puts
it most forcefully:
[T]he one overwhelming argument in favor of linking
environment and security: that environmental prob-
lems must always be presented from within a broader
perspective that encompasses various forms of ineq-
uity, including world poverty. Why is this the case? It
is the case precisely because poverty and inequity are
two of the key factors contributing to tension and
insecurity throughout the world."'
Several academic researchers studying environmental conflict
situations around the world have documented patterns that are
consistent with the view that social and political inequities, rather
than scarcity of resources, are the prime causes of resource mis-
allocation and violence. For example, one study shows that violence
between different ethnic, tribal, and/or religious groups is present
in struggles over oil production in countries as diverse as Nigeria
115 Steve Lonergan, Human Security, Environmental Security, and Sustainable
Development in ENVIRONMENTAND SECURITY: DIsCOURSES AND PRACTICES 66,67
(Miriam R. Lowi & Brian R. Shaw eds., 2000).
... See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
117 See Lonergan, supra note 115, at 71.
118 Id. at 70-71.
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and Ecuador (and now, perhaps, Iraq). "9 Another study documents
systematic theft and physical violence in the competition between
individual communities and larger commercial operators for
prime shrimp-farming properties along the coast of Thailand. 120
Even environmental conflict situations that have elements of the
environmental scarcity scenario, on close analysis, are strongly
influenced by social (caste) or tribal conflicts and violent exercises
of state police power. Moreover, the exercises of power tend to be
on one side of the struggle, such as the imposition of new restrictions
on traditional community access to forest resources.'12
The political ecology perspective, which emphasizes social
and political context and struggles for equity and power as the
determining factors behind environmental violence, seems an even
gloomier science than the environmental scarcity analysis of
Homer-Dixon because the underlying problems it exposes are even
more difficult to solve on national and international scales than
"mere" environmental scarcity. However, there also is an upside to
the stress on intragenerational equity, because it leads to the under-
standing that environmental conflicts are amenable to political
solutions. Two scholars at the Global Environmental Change and
Human Security study center at the University of California,
Irvine, have identified several instances of positive social and
political adaptation to resolve environmental conflicts, or at least
to remove the violent element.'22 They differentiate their work
from other environmental security studies partly because of the
119 See Michael Watts, Petro-Violence: Community, Extraction, and Political
Ecology of a Mythic Commodity, in VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 9, at
189, 200-12.
120 Susan C. Stonich & Peter Vandergeest, Violence, Environment, and
Industrial Shrimp Farming, in VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 9, at 261.
121 Nandini Sundar, Beyond the Bounds? Violence at the Margins of New Legal
Geographies, in VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 9, at 328-31; see also Amita
Baviskar, Written on the Body, Written on the Land: Violence and Environmental
Struggles in Central India, in VIOLENT ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 9, at 354;
Lydia Polgreen, Blood Flows with Oil in Poor Nigerian Villages, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.mindfully.org/Energy/2006/Blood-With-Oil
ljan06.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
122 McDonald & Gaulin, supra note 57.
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time scale of their analysis, which spans a decade or more to
capture both the evolution of the situation leading to violent
confrontation and the ensuing social adaptations that reduce
tensions.123 They correctly assert that this approach gives full
significance to the concept of sustainable development, which, by
its nature, is a continuing process. 124 One observer has commented
that development is "a learning-process which increases a society's
viability;" 25 another notes that "sustainability focuses on changing
the way we think about the environment." 26 Therefore, one of the
important lessons about the link between sustainable development
and security is that we must take the long-term view. This is not
an excuse for inaction; quite the contrary, immediate actions are
required if we are to alleviate environmental threats to security
that will become manifest ten or twenty years from now. 27
B. Redefining Security
What do we mean by national security? What should we
mean? United States national security policy in the 1980s,
construed national security in classic terms-the defense of
national territory and welfare against external threats, especially
threats of military or quasi-military attack.28 In the post-Cold
12 3 Id. at 5.
124 Id. at 6.
125 WOLFGANG SACHS ET AL., GREENING THE NORTH: A POST-INDUSTRIAL
BLUEPRINT FOR ECOLOGY AND EQUITY 158 (1998) (quoting Ghanian economist
Ebenezer Mireku) [hereinafter GREENING].
126 Lonergan, supra note 95, at 82.
127 We have a vivid demonstration of this in terms of the social and
environmental damage wrought along the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina in
2005, much of which could have been prevented if suitable policies had been
implemented and measures taken decades before. See infra notes 190-99 and
accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on National
Security, Feb. 26, 1986, available at http://reagan202O.us/speeches/addresson_
national_security.asp; President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on
National Security, Mar. 23, 1983, available at http://teachingamericanhistory.
org/library/index.asp?document=730 (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
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War 1990s, the field of environmental security studies led the
Department of Defense, the State Department, NATO, and others
to redefine U.S. national security interests to embrace threats from
environmental degradation and chaos in foreign lands leading to
migration, disruption of economic activities, and the like. 129 Under
the influence of this thinking, the official U.S. national security
strategy moved to preventive security by taking measures "to
prevent the conditions for conflict and help to create the conditions
for peace."130 After September 11th, the United States government
identifies nonstate actors (terrorists) as the most substantial
threats to national security.13 1 In 2002, Secretary of State Colin
Powell remarked that "sustainable development is a security
imperative. Poverty, destruction of the environment and despair
are destroyers of people, of societies, of nations, a cause of instability
as an unholy trinity that can destabilize countries and destabilize
entire regions." 32 Security analysis has clearly moved beyond the
traditional focus on inter-state conflict and military defense. This
shift is a step in the right direction, but this section will argue that
we need a much broader view of security to truly appreciate both the
security challenges confronting us and their connection to sustain-
able development. To begin imagining a broader view of national
security, we must consider the following two questions: (1) security
for whom; and (2) security from what risks?
Security for whom? In the customary terms of the environ-
mental security dialogue, the very term 'national security'
implicitly answers that question by identifying the nation (or, in
current parlance, the 'homeland') as the object to be secured. The
term 'nation,' however, is at once an abstraction and a construct of
a particular configuration of social organization that emerged only
129 See supra notes 1, 37-38, 66-69 and accompanying text.
130 Mary Margaret Evans et al., The Changing Definition of National Security,
in ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY, supra note 95, at 11 (quoting a 1996 speech by
then Secretary of Defense William Perry).
131 See NAT'L SECURITY STRATEGY 2002, supra note 36.
132 Introduction to Should Global Poverty be a U.S. National Security Issue? 9
ECSP REP. at 12 (2003) (quotations omitted).
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in recent centuries,133 so the question of security for whom remains
relevant. In 1995, the International Commission on Global
Governance urged that thinking about "[gilobal security must be
broadened from it[s] traditional focus on the security of states to
include the security of people and the planet. " 134 That statement
captures the dual challenge of reconceiving national security. In
one way of thinking, nations are the elements of and participants
in the global community of nations. 15 The integration of economies
and cultures that marks the world of the twenty-first century, along
with the objective ecological integrity of the planet, makes obvious
that any one nation's national security is considerably bound up
with the security of other nations. This interdependence is why the
Commission emphasizes the security of "the planet"136 and it is one
of the central themes of environmental security analysis. I will
return to that dimension in answering the question of what are the
security threats against which we might be guarding.
Apart from the nation, or the nation-state, the Commission
also refers to the security of people.137 From this point of view, the
nation state-that is, the government that interacts within the
framework of international law-is nothing more than the
constitutional representative of the individual citizens of that
nation acting collectively.'38 The security of individuals, however,
is more than the disaggregation of the security of the nation. In the
modern world one of the most important goals of national govern-
ments has become the provision of security for their citizens. Lloyd
Axworthy, Canada's foreign minister during much of the 1990s,
133 See Philip Bobbit, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY 75-204 (2002) (charting the progression from princely states to kingly
states to territorial states, and thence from "state-nations" in the late 18th and
19th centuries to "nation-states" in the 20th century).
134 Eric K. Stem, The Case for Comprehensive Security, in CONTESTED GROUNDS,
supra note 16, at 127, 133.
135 See id. at 39.
136 Id. at 133.
137 Id.
138 International law defines "states" in part by their exercise of government
authority with the consent of the governed. See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP
R. TRIMBLE, & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAw 432-41 (4th ed. 2003).
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repeatedly sounded a theme of "human security."'39 In a speech to
the North Atlantic Council of NATO in 1998, he mentioned heavy
losses of civilian life in civil conflicts and the "terrorist dangers
each of us can face inside our own borders."14 From these exam-
ples of insecurity, he concluded: "[w]hile the old interstate security
threats persist, this changing environment puts the security of
ordinary citizens more directly at risk."' On another occasion,
speaking directly about terrorism, he remarked:
Terrorism may never be eliminated, but its attraction
can be significantly diminished by addressing causes:
poverty, despair, disenfranchisement, religious fanati-
cism, absence of effective and meaningful democracy,
etc. Some of these efforts have already been under-
taken. They are complex, resource-intensive and
require innovative international co-operation. This is
a human security approach .... '42
139 Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign
Affairs, to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 16, 2000,
available at http://www.peace.ca/axworthyaddresstwoodrow.htm (citing new
priorities and initiatives in Canada's foreign policy as "the basis for our human
security approach").
140 The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Address to the North Atlantic Council Meeting (Dec. 8, 1998), http://www/nato.
int/docu/speechl998/s981208i.htm. Similarly, in another speech he remarked:
[A] shift has occurred in what it means to be secure. As a result,
the language of international affairs has begun to change. No
longer are we limited to discussions of states' rights and
national sovereignty.... This shift in language reflects a change
in perception-a recognition that the needs of individuals must
be our principal concern. We arrived at this point via the broad
realization that there is a changing world reality.
The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Notes
for an Address to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (June
16, 2000), http://www.peace.ca/axworthyaddresstwoodrow.htm.
141 Id.
112 The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Comments on "Nuclear Waste Management
in Canada: The Security Dimension" by Professor Franklyn Griffiths (2003),
http://www.nwmo.ca/adx/asp/adxGetMedia.asp?DocID=279,206,199,20,1,
Documents&MediaID=993&Filename=14_NWMOCommentsAxworthy.pdf.
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Axworthy contrasts this human security approach with the "crusade"
of counter-terrorism, which he characterizes as "primarily a military
response, non-collaborative in approach."
43
Axworthy is far from alone in his emphasis on human
security as opposed to state security, but many who share his per-
spective address the issue as one of the collective interests of many
individuals. Steve Lonergan, for example, sees human security as
one dimension of environmental security because environmental
degradation and resource depletion are two of the many factors that
affect human security.144 Correspondingly, Lonergan sees the source
of our insecurity as "individual or collective human perceptions and
evaluations of actual and expected conditions of the environment."4'
Another analyst frames the environmental security challenge in
similar human security terms:
A threat to national security exists once an action or
sequence of events "threatens ...to degrade the
quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or...
threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy
choices available to the government of a state or to
private nongovernmental entities within the state."46
This last statement, focusing on the "range of policy
choices" 147 available to governments and private actors alike, pulls
thinking about environmental security back into the orbit of sus-
tainable development, which also is concerned with maintaining
options for future generations. With an appropriately broad
conception of security, the link between sustainable development
and security thus becomes inescapable."4 Even conventional or
official formulations touch on the theme. In 1996, when Secretary of
143 id.
144 Lonergan, supra note 95, at 68.
145 Id. at 82.146 Michel Fred6rick, A Realist's Conceptual Definition of Environmental Security,
in CONTESTED GROUNDS, supra note 16, at 93 (quoting Richard Ullman).
147 See id.
148 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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Defense William Perry defined the task of national security as
"prevent[ing] the conditions for conflict and help[ing] to create the
conditions for peace,"'49 he specifically alluded to George Marshall,
who said in 1947 that the national security of the United States
depended in part on "restoring confidence of the people of Europe
and the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a
whole." 5 ° This is the language of sustainable development, though
the term had not yet been coined.
In much the same vein, other analysts define security as an
issue of governance or as "the capacity for societal resilience."' 5 '
Governance and resilience again are ideas that resonate in
definitions of sustainable development. This analysis also plays
into other subthemes of sustainable development, such as the
participation of civil society in the formulation of policy and the
need for social institutions to underpin economic development and
measures for environmental protection. 5 2
One can take this broad notion of security further and ask
other questions that are germane to sustainable development as
well as security. For example, what constitutes security for an
Amazon tribe? Does their security lie in sustainable development?
If sustainable development means some policy determined in
Brasilia, the answer is arguably, no. But if sustainable develop-
ment means development that sustains all, including cultures
still intact that live apart from modern society, and preserves
environmental and social options for communities, then the
security of the tribe and the tribe's sustainable development would
be synonymous.
The small island states of the Pacific have raised security
concerns in a more poignant context. Even in classical terms-
defense of the sovereign territory against physical invasion from
149 Evans et al., supra note 95, at 11 (quoting a 1996 speech by then Secretary
of Defense William Perry).
150 Id. at 13.
151 Steve Rayner & Elizabeth C. Malone, Security, Governance, and the
Environment, in ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY, supra note 95, at 49, 50.
152 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 62-65, 308-42; see also MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 178-200.
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the outside-their overriding national security interest is in
arresting climate change, which is bringing with it rising sea
levels.15 Acting as the Association of Small Island States, they
have been appealing urgently to the international community to
take steps to stop global warming, lest their territories literally
disappear beneath the waves."5 In a very real sense, the personal
security of the islanders and the national security of their states
are one and the same.
Whether one holds to a classic definition of national security
or embraces the much broader definition argued for here, there are
some common elements to security that, once again, coincide with
the perspective of sustainable development. First, there is the
matter of autonomy, whether it be national independence or
personal freedom. Independence and freedom mean more than the
mere recognition of individuality; they also imply the absence of
physical threat or psychological intimidation, be it from weapons,
terrorists, police, or individuals who would do violence.'55 However,
physical threats to integrity and well-being can also arise from
environmental changes, both those that are self-inflicted, as well
as those imposed through actions beyond one's control.'56 Finally,
a full definition of security must include the notion of future
opportunities and the ability to exercise national or personal choice
153 See, e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001:
Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, § 17.2.2.1, available
at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wg2/ (discussing the threat to small
island states from projected sea level rise due to climate change of approxi-
mately 5mm per year). Villages in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea have
recently been relocated because of rising sea levels. Ben Boheme, Vanuatu: A
Village Flees for Safer Ground, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 23, 2005,
available at http://www.climateark.org/articles/reader.asp?linkid=49844.154 See, e.g., Statement by Ambassador Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Samoa) on behalf
of the Ass'n of Small Island States, to the Meeting of the Intergovernmental
Group of Experts on Energy and Sustainable Development, Mar. 6, 2000,
available at http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/statements/07.html.
'
55 See generally J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Mill also argues against social oppression
by religious groups and others on issues of personal behavior).
156 See supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text. This truth was made vivid by
the physical destruction and social dislocation wrought by Hurricane Katrina.
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to take advantage of such opportunities.'57 In terms of environ-
mental security analysis, opportunity goes hand in hand with access
to environmental resources. 158 For example, in many respects inter-
national law already contains the idea of equal access for all nations
to the global commons, which some would argue is an "inalienable"
right.'59 A broad conception of security, consistent with sustainable
development would include an extension of a right of access and an
equality of opportunity to all essential environmental resources and
offer opportunities for personal and national development. Pursuit
of this goal would simultaneously mitigate the social sources of
environmental violence, which so frequently involve control of or
restrictions on access to vital resources. 160
III. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT STEPS TOWARD SECURITY FOR
THE UNITED STATES
The standard model environmental security literature of the
1990s portrayed a security threat coming from degraded environ-
mental conditions and population growth leading to social
breakdown, migration, and violent conflict over scarce resources in
developing countries, thereby threatening the security of the
developed world.' 6 ' In the early years of the twenty-first century,
the focus has shifted somewhat to poverty and economic mal-
development leading to state failure,'6 2 which opens the way to
violent internal conflict and to terrorist activities threatening
developed societies. Even the reformist environmental security
scholars, with their well-placed emphasis on the social and
157 See infra note 148.
158 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 44 ("Sustainable development
requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to
satisfy their aspirations for a better life."); id. at 48 ("many problems arise from
inequalities in access to resources").
159 GREENING, supra note 125, at 163.
160 See Peluso & Watts, Responses, supra note 9.
161 See supra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
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political roots of environmental violence, devote their analysis to
case studies in developing countries. 1
63
But there is another environmental security threat to
developed countries that is becoming more evident each year: a
direct threat to individual and national well-being from environ-
mental change, especially climate change."M The WCED saw this
threat nearly 30 years ago: "Environmental threats to security are
now beginning to emerge on a global scale. The most worrisome of
these stem from the possible consequences of global warming .... 165
This Part will argue that this self-inflicted environmental security
threat is as great or greater than the traditional environmental
scarcity threat. To address it will require a hard look at our own
lifestyles as a major contributor to our increasing insecurity.
As far back as 1992, the Rio Declaration urged countries to
"reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption" as part of the world effort to achieve sustainable
development."l Many production practices in developing countries,
such as forest clearing for agriculture or excessive pollution from
manufacturing, are unsustainable. But as Simon Dalby has
remarked, portraying the link between environment and security
in terms of behaviors in developing countries avoids looking at
consumption patterns in the developed countries themselves,
which are contributing to the environmental conditions that
threaten their own long-term security.'6 7 This Part embraces
Dalby's logic, arguing that the pursuit of sustainable development
in the United States by curtailing our unmistakable consumption
patterns would contribute enormously to our own environmental
security. 6 ' I will use energy consumption, and particularly the
consumption of fossil fuels, to exemplify both the unsustainable
163 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
'4 See supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
165 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27, at 294.
166 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted June 13, 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 princ. 8 (1992).
167 Simon Dalby, Threats from the South?: Geopolitics, Equity, and
Environmental Security, in CONTESTED GROUNDS, supra note 16, at 155, 161.
168 Id. at 164.
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pattern of U.S. consumption and the immediate threat our
consumption presents to our own national security.
There are two aspects of the security threat posed by our
own consumption patterns. One is that extraction of mineral,
energy, and forest resources from developing countries adds to the
very environmental stresses in those countries cited repeatedly in
the environmental security literature.'6 9 The other is that our
consumption patterns directly undermine the security we derive
from the environmental services provided by the ecological
resources within our own borders. This Part will take up the direct
security effect of consumption on domestic environmental change
first, and then return to the more traditional issues of environ-
mental change in developing countries driven by North American
consumption patterns.
A. Precaution, Equity, and Responsibility
To give some prescriptive direction to the discussion, this
analysis will apply three normative values that originate in or
connect closely with sustainable development-the values of
precaution, equity, and responsibility."'7 The actions and policies of
a developed country striving to enhance security through sustain-
able development should properly implement these principles.
Violations of any one of them is indicative of a significant deviation
from the sustainable development path.
Widely popular with environmentalists, the precautionary
principle remains controversial as a legal or prescriptive norm, but
it has long been accepted as a general guide to action.' 7 ' The Rio
Declaration, which uses the term "precautionary approach" to
avoid the legal implications of the word "principle," gives a
169 See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
17o See generally Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission
on Environment and Development, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1986).
" See generally DAVID HUNTER ETAL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 405-11 (2d ed. 2002).
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standard description of the concept: "[wihere there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation." 72 As called for in the Rio
Declaration, a developed country like the United States should
"widely" apply a precautionary approach.'73
Precaution helps to promote the sustainable development
goal of maintaining viable ecosystems in order to preserve options
for future generations to meet their needs. Sustainable develop-
ment notions of equity, especially intragenerational equity, were
presented in Part II above.'74 It bears emphasis here that sus-
tainable development policy cannot achieve its security objective
if it falls substantially short of meeting equitable criteria. Equity
considerations are relevant not only in the international context,
but also in the domestic context, where some groups within
American society are more vulnerable than others to the loss of
security through environmental change.'75
The concept of responsibility derives from the Rio Declaration
affirmation that all nations have "common, but differentiated"
responsibilities to help the world as a whole "conserve, protect and
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem."'76 The
notion of responsibility carries overtones of legal obligation and
legal liability to other countries, which may be appropriate to
consider with respect to specific decisions and their environmental
consequences even though international law may not attach legal
responsibility to the implementation of sustainable development
policy in general.'77
172 Rio Declaration, supra note 166, at princ. 15.
173 Id.
174 See supra notes 91-160 and accompanying text.
175 See discussion infra notes 197-207, 230.
176 Rio Declaration, supra note 166, at princ. 7.
177 The WCED Legal Experts explore some of these questions using a
conventional distinction between liability (for lawful acts) and responsibility (for
unlawful acts). See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 170, at 80-85, 127-30.
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Whether or not responsibility is fraught with legal signifi-
cance, developed countries have accepted that they bear a special
responsibility "in view of the pressures their societies place on the
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources
they command." 7 '
B. Unsustainable Consumption and Ecosystem Changes in
the United States
One security effect of developed country consumption is
direct impairment of environmental resources and services in the
consuming countries themselves. The most obvious way U.S.
consumption directly contributes to our own insecurity is our
gargantuan appetite for oil and other fossil fuel energy. The United
States is by far the world's largest consumer of energy, using
approximately 98 quadrillion British thermal units, or quads, each
year, which equates to more than 23% of world energy use.'79
Fossil fuels, with carbon content that gives them high global
warming potential, account for nearly 85% of U.S. energy.' ° Close
to half of U.S. fossil fuel energy comes from petroleum. 18 ' The
United States accounts for more than a quarter of the world's total
petroleum consumption, nearly matching the entire national energy
consumption of China from all sources. 8 2 On a per capita basis, the
United States stands out as a profligate energy consumer, exceeded
only by Persian Gulf oil producers Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates.'13
'7 Rio Declaration, supra note 166, at princ. 7.
179 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2006, Early Release, tbl.2,
Energy Consumption by Sector and Source, at 3, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
aeo/pdf/aeotab_2.pdf. The 98 quads of energy consumption in the U.S. compares
with 411 quads for world consumption. See Energy Info. Admin., International
Energy Annual 2003, tbl.E. 1, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/
tableel.xls.
' See id. (of the 98 quads, a total of 84.38 quads come from petroleum, natural
gas, and coal).
18 1 See id. (of the 84.38 quads from fossil fuel, 38.96 quads come from petroleum).
182 China's total energy consumption in 2003 was 45 quads.
183 Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Annual 2003, tbl.E.lc, at http:ll
www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tableelc.xls. Compare U.S. per capita
use of 340 MMBtu with, for example, 151 MMBtu for Western Europe. Id.
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One way to understand the environmental consequence of
all this energy consumption is to calculate the "energy footprint,"
which is the surface area required to provide the fuels and absorb
the wastes from their use." 4 The average energy footprint for each
person in the United States is six hectares (roughly 15 acres). 8 5
This means that 300 million Americans require 1.8 billion hectares
to support their energy habit, a national footprint close to twice the
area of the 50 United States.'86 In other words, the United States
fully uses not only the ecosystem services of the United States
itself but takes an equal amount of the world's ecosystem services
from the peoples of other countries.
Driven so far mainly by the historic and continuing high rates
of emissions of greenhouse gasses in developed countries, global
climate change is already causing physical destruction to important
economic assets in the United States and other developed countries.
Some of the effects are arguably trivial, such as shorter ski seasons.
Others are tragic, such as loss of life and property due to inten-
sifying tropical storms in the United States,187 or unprecedented
extremes of summer heat, winter storms, drought, and flood in
Western Europe."s The resulting decline in security for many people
is palpable. Fishermen, lumbermen, farmers, resort operators, and
others who make their livelihood from nature are either losing that
184 World Wildlife Fund, Living Planet Report 2004, at 14, http://assets.panda.
org/downloads/lpr2004.pdf.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 Estimates of insured losses from Katrina are $55 billion, with total damage
estimated at $135 billion. 2005 storms Rita and Wilma caused an estimated $15
billion damage each. Swiss Re Estimates 2004 storms Jerome and Frances also
caused extensive damage. Record $80 billion in insured losses during 2005.
NAMIC Online, Dec. 21,2005, at http://www.namic.org/topnews/05122lstl.asp.
188 Spain is suffering its worst drought ever. See news story at website of the
World Meteorological Organization, http://www.wmo.ch/index-en.html. In 2003,
Western Europe, especially France, suffered extreme heat for several weeks. See
Impacts of Summer 2003 Heat Wave in Europe at http://www.grid.unepich/
product/publication/downloadlewheatwave.en.pdf. Serious flooding has struck
Europe in recent years. See, e.g., Northern Europe Flooding, July 2002,
http://earth.esa.int/ew/floods/northern-europe-org.
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livelihood or paying higher costs to maintain their productivity. As
often happens, the people most directly affected are the most
vulnerable and have the fewest options. In the United States and
Canada, the people most vulnerable to climate change include the
Inuit and other tribal groups in the Arctic, who are seeing their
whole way of life disintegrate as the Arctic winter shortens, the sea-
ice disappears in the summer, and animal populations decline or
relocate in the face of the changing climate.189
Hurricane Katrina in the autumn of 2005 illustrates the
loss of security involved in America's continued pursuit of unsus-
tainable patterns of production and consumption and its tardiness
in reshaping its economy to meet the objectives of sustainable
development. If any doubts were left, Hurricane Rita a few weeks
later should have erased them. Global warming is almost surely
part of the story-Katrina and Rita were particularly intense
hurricanes because of unusually warm waters in the southeastern
Gulf of Mexico. 9 ° Other patterns of unsustainable consumption
and unsustainable development in the Gulf Coast region also con-
tributed to the tragic loss of life, enormous property damage, and
economic disruption caused by the hurricanes. Intensive commercial
and residential development of vulnerable barrier islands and beach
areas placed billions of dollars of property into areas prone to
destruction by a hurricane. 191 Ironically, that intensive development
' Clifford Kraus, Eskimos Fret as Climate Shifts and Wildlife Changes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2004, at A4; see also Daniel Glick, GeoSigns: The Big Thaw, 206
NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, No. 3, at 12 (Sept. 2004); Fen Montaigne, EcoSigns: No Room
to Run, 206 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, No. 3, at 34 (Sept. 2004); Andrew C. Revkin, In a
Melting Trend, Less Arctic Ice to Go Around, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at Al.
190 P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and
Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844, Sept. 16, 2005
(concluding that global data document a 30-year trend toward more frequent
and more intense storms, especially Category 4 and 5 storms, and that this trend
is "not inconsistent" with climate change modeling predicting increased
frequency of the most intense tropical storms).
191 See generally Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCIENCE
1040, Aug. 12, 2005 (noting that increasing casualty insurance losses worldwide
are attributable in significant part to socioeconomic and demographic trends, in
particular the migration of people to flood-prone areas).
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includes critical segments of the U.S. capacity for producing and
importing oil and natural gas and the onshore facilities for pro-
cessing, refining, and distributing those fuels, 92 revealing another
security vulnerability. Furthermore, the protective wetlands to the
south of New Orleans are smaller and less resilient after decades of
artificial management of the Mississippi River cut off sediments
needed to restore soils.19 3 Ill-advised shipping channels and multiple
incursions into the wetlands to provide access to oil and gas wells
further degraded the wetlands.'9 Additionally, the levee and flood
wall system protecting the city of New Orleans was not designed to
withstand a full-force hurricane; it also suffered from critical design
flaws, including those in shipping access channels that helped
funnel the storm surge directly into the eastern end of the city.'95
The potential for all of the devastating consequences of these faults
had been identified years earlier, but the government failed to
commit the necessary funds to correct them. 96 The social and
economic effects were particularly tragic because New Orleans was
beset with social and racial divisions, a weak economy, and inade-
quate public services,197 all of which led to a startling breakdown in
local security in the week following the storm. 9 In the case of Rita,
vulnerable lower-income communities of southwest Louisiana were
almost completely destroyed. 99
192 LAWRENCE KuMINS & ROBERT BAMBERGER, OIL AND GAS DISRUPTION FROM
HURRICANE KATRINA AND RITA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Oct. 21, 2005,
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/55824.pdf.
193 Joel Bourne, Louisiana's Vanishing Wetlands: Going, Going..., 289 SCIENCE
1860, Sept. 15, 2000; Sediment Transport: Restoring Louisiana's Coastal
Landscape, WATERMARKS, Aug. 2005, available at http://www.lacoast.gov/water
marks/2005.08/watermarks-2005-08.pdf (a publication of the U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, New Orleans Dist.).
194 Id.
195 Christopher Drew & Andrew Revkin, Storm and Crisis: The Defenses: Design
Flaws Seen in New Orleans Flood Walls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at Al.
196 Louis Uchitelle, Disasters Waiting to Happen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at Cl.
197 Id.
198 See id.
199 Jennifer Steinhauer, Smaller Communities on Coast Bore Brunt of Rita's
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at Al.
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C. Unsustainable Patterns of Consumption and
Global Security
As one group of commentators has remarked, "[iin general
terms, industrial countries do far more harm to the poor in the
South by what they lay claim to for themselves than by with-
holding assistance."2"' The endless appetite of the North for
resources and goods appropriates important resources from the
South for consumptive use in the North, arguably in a manner that
is neither equitable nor observant of the principle of precaution.
Moreover, the business of acquiring the resources, with developed
country governments often lending diplomatic or financial support
to private companies,20 ' also foments the political power struggles
for control over abundant resources in developing countries that
exacerbate social tensions and give rise to civil or revolutionary
conflict. 2 2 A report for the World Bank cautions that the pro-
duction of valuable mineral and energy resources in developing
countries and their export to developed countries frequently lead
to a decline in living standards rather than sustainable economic
development, an outcome known as the "resource curse."
20 3
200 GREENING, supra note 125, at 158.
201 One modest example: The U.S. Export-Import Bank financed a national gas
project in Qatar, "helping to meet U.S. energy needs." News Release, Ex-Im
Bank Finances Qatargas 3 Liquid Natural Gas Complex, Dec. 15, 2005, http:l!
www.exim.gov/pressrelease.cfm/2FD72175-0B53-5374-ADE746A6F632ACOB. On
a more serious level, a former CIA operative reports on U.S. government use of
the CIA in support of energy industry interests in Western Asia. ROBERT BOER,
SEE No EVIL (2002).
202 See, e.g., HUMANRIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES (1999),
available at http://hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/index.htm; IRIN Focus ON THE
SIMMERING CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA (2001), available at http://www.irin
news.org/report.asp?ReportID=18255&SelectRegion=WestAfrica (IRIN is a news
service of the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs).
203 Extractive Industries Review, Striking a Better Balance: The World Bank
Group and Extractive Industries 2-3 (2003), http://iris36.worldbank.org/domdoc/
PRD/Other/PRDDContainer.nsf/AIl+Documents85256D240074B56385256FF
6006843AB/$File/volume lenglish.pdf.
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Beyond the mere appropriation of a disproportionate share of
the available resources in the world, unsustainable consumption in
the North has social and environmental ramifications for developing
countries that further impair the security of the people of the South
even if they do not seem to impinge directly on the security of the
North. The production and consumption of food and other agricul-
tural products (cotton, for example) is a salient case in point. On the
one hand ease of transportation and the purchasing power of
Northern firms created global markets of agricultural products, with
producers from developing countries competing with each other for
export sales.2" Meanwhile, governments of Northern countries also
pay for enormous subsidies and other production incentives to their
own farmers so that they can compete in this global marketplace in
spite of their high costs of production.2 "5 The net effect has been
to drive down the world market prices for many agricultural
products, including sugar, cotton, and corn.20 6 Farmers in the rural
South who can no longer make a living on the land because of
declining commodity prices migrate to urban areas where their
personal and environmental security is very low.2"7 The WCED
cited urban air quality, water quality, and inadequate sanitation
in developing countries as grave environmental harms affecting
204 See CHRISTOPHER DELGADO, NICHOLAS MINOT, & NIKOLAS WADA, HIGH VALUE
AGRICULTRE (2001), available from the Int'l Food Pol'y Research Inst. at http://
www.ifpri.org/2020/focus/focusO8/focus08_06.htm.
205 See, e.g., Food and Agric. Org., COTTON: IMPACT OF SUPPORT POLICIES ON
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-WHY DO THE NUMBERS VARY? (2004), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/y5533e/y5533eOO.pdf [hereinafter FAOI.
206 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2004: Realizing the Development
Promise of the Doha Agenda xvii-xix (2003) (estimating developed country
agricultural subsidies of $330 billion per year and calculating that their removal
would result in a $350 billion gain in welfare for developed countries and an
additional $170 billion for developing countries); FAO, supra note 205, at 2
(giving estimates of price increases for cotton of 2%-35% if developed country
subsidies are removed).
207 For an interesting, complex analysis of migration patterns, see Catherine
Locke, W. Neil Adger, & P. Mick Kelly, Changing Places: Environmental Impact
of Migration, ENV'T, Sept. 2000, at 24.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 30:321
the health and even the lives of millions of people. 2 8 Even if
displaced people remain in rural areas, social problems can arise.
In Yunnan Province, China, overly intensive collection of mountain
plants needed to satisfy export demands for Chinese medicines
has prompted the authorities to resettle entire communities of
indigenous people to more tropical lowland regions, resulting in
social tensions and health problems for the resettled people as well
as significant changes in land use.20 9 More commonly, especially in
Africa and Latin America, young people from rural households
migrate to the North, often illegally, to secure higher paying jobs
that can help support their families in the home country.210 Such
migrations lead to political tensions and occasional violence, and
displaced communities in the North become prime recruiting areas
for terrorist networks. In a more direct threat to the environment,
government programs to increase commodity exports to developed
country markets often work to accelerate the degradation of ecolog-
ical systems for short-term economic gain regardless of long-term
environmental costs. For example, the government of Vietnam has
promoted large scale coffee farming and shrimp farming, with
devastating consequences for upland forest zones and for coastal
mangroves and other wetland ecosystems.21' In another example
from southeast Asia, construction of dams in China to meet rapidly
increasing energy needs will moderate the seasonal variations in the
natural flow of the Mekong River, threatening to disrupt, among
others, the fishery in the Tonle Sap that is a major source of animal
protein for the people of Cambodia, not to mention the source of
livelihood for thousands of people.212
208 See OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27.
... From a presentation of interim research results by the Asian International Rivers
Center, Yunnan University, to a World Wildlife Fund workshop, July 18, 2005.
210 Nina Bernstein, Most Mexican Immigrants in New Study Gave Up Jobs to
Take Their Chances in U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2005, at A30; Romesh Ratnesar,
Knocking on Europe's Door, TIME (EUROPE), July 3, 2000.
211 See LOCKE ET AL., supra note 207.
212 Fred Pearce, Where have all the Fish Gone? The Mighty Mekong is Drying
Up-and so is the River's Rich Harvest. Vast New Dams in China Could Be to
Blame, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 14, 2004.
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These examples reveal complex patterns of ecological
disruption across a range of geographic scales and time periods
that have or are likely to result in environmental losses to security
across national boundaries. If such ecological changes were only
isolated anecdotes, the environmental and security consequences
might be manageable. Unfortunately, as documented recently by
the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment project, the overwhelming
scale of human activity and the widening web of global intercon-
nections mean that the accumulation of these local and regional
environmental changes is seriously impinging on the global
ecological web, threatening the security of all.2 13
Yet many of these environmental and social changes in the
South remain more or less invisible to the distant consumers of the
North whose purchases are driving them. Geographical distance
and lack of a legal jurisdictional connection between the consuming
decision maker and the producing communities make it difficult
to build a coordinated approach to ecosystem management.2 14
Ideally, market mechanisms would mediate between consumer
and producer, but global patterns of production mean that buyers
of common commodities have multiple sources of supply, which
leaves the individual producers in the position of being price takers,
without effective control over their own production choices.21 5
Moreover, the consumer typically lacks information about the origin
of the product or the manner of its production and is therefore
unable to express any preference for one product over another.216
Building information links between consumers and producers can
be effective in changing the market's response, but this task is not
easily accomplished.
21 3 MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, EcOsYSTEMs AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS 1-2 (2005).
214 Peter Dauvergne, Dying of Consumption: Accidents or Sacrifices of Global
Morality?, 5 GLOBAL ENvTL. POLITICS, No. 3, at 35, 38 (Aug. 2005).215 See, e.g., DELGADO ET AL., supra note 204.
216 Apart from organic food labels and some environmental certification of wood
products, consumer information labels about the environmental merits of
products in the United States are scarce.
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Environmental labeling and other consumer information
systems are promising initiatives to fill this gap, but are still very
modest in scale. 217 For developing country producers, the opportu-
nities and demands of the export market are thus exogenous
variables over which they have limited control.21 In short, putting
Northern consumption on the path of sustainable development for
Southern producers, with corresponding security benefits for both
parties, is a formidable challenge.
Climate change, which has immediate effects on the United
States and other Northern countries described in the preceding
section, also has enormous implications for the security of people
in the South. As a recent report on the environmental and social
consequences of climate change succinctly states, "[d]espite their
minimal, per-person contributions to greenhouse gas emissions,
the impacts of climate change will disproportionately affect people
living in poverty in developing countries."219 The report finds that
floods, storms, and droughts present the most widespread risk to
human security,2 ' and documents the consequences of these hydro-
meteorolgical changes on developing countries and communities in
terms of the basic human needs identified in the WCED definition
of sustainable development, including food, water, and health.22 '
D. Precaution, Equity, and Responsibility
In the face of documented environmental change already
occurring and its devastating consequences for many in the
developing world, the United States government dismisses global
217 U.S. ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING ISSUES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES WORLDWIDE (1998), http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/epp/pubs/envlab/
wwlabel3.pdf.
218 Dauvergne, supra note 214, at 36.
219 Andrew Simms, John Magrath, & Hannah Reid, UP IN SMOKE? THREATS
FROM, AND RESPONSES TO, THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL WARMING ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 29 (2004). This report is a joint effort of many nongovernmental
groups, mostly European, organized as The Working Group on Climate Change
and Development.220 Id. at 5.
221 See id.
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climate change as a pressing issue. U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
continue to steadily increase, despite committing to reduce such
emissions under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change.22 2 This posture violates all three principles of
sustainability and security enumerated above.
First, it is a policy that spurns any notion of precaution.
Scientists repeatedly warn that inexorable changes in the climate
are already under way but could be mitigated with early action to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions drastically.223 Even some oil
industry leaders predict "disaster" if governments do not take
urgent action.224 The George W. Bush Administration's vague and
rather unrealistic promises of research on new energy technologies
such as hydrogen are neither timely nor effective enough to
achieve the necessary immediate reductions in greenhouse gas
225emissions. Most energy commentators agree that we need
222 See United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Parties and Observers, Annex I, http://unfccc.int/parties-andobservers/
parties/items/2228.php.223 See, e.g., T.M.L. Wigley, The Climate Change Commitment, 307 SCIENCE 1766,
Mar. 18, 2005 (estimating a temperature rise of 1 degree Celsius and a sea level
rise of 10 centimeters per century if all emissions ceased today, and a
temperature rise of 2 to 6 degrees Celsius and sea level rise of 25 centimeters
per century if emissions were kept constant at today's levels); Gerald A. Meehl
et al., How Much More Global Warming and Sea Level Rise, 307 SCIENCE 1769,
1772, Mar. 18, 2005 (using a different analytical methodology but coming to
similar conclusions as Wigley, such that "we are already committed to significant
warming and sea level rise no matter what scenario we follow"); Michael D.
Mastradrea & Stephen H. Schneider, Probabilistic Integrated Assessment of
"Dangerous" Climate Change, 304 SCIENCE 571, 674, Apr. 23, 2004 (concluding
"[ilt is possible that some thresholds for dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system are already exceeded, and it is likely that more such
thresholds are approaching.... [DIespite great uncertainty in many aspects of
integrated assessment, prudent actions can substantially reduce the likelihood
and thus the risks of dangerous anthropogenic interference").
224 Geoffrey Lean, Apocalypse Now: How Mankind is Sleepwalking to the End of
the Earth, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 6, 2005 (quoting Lord Oxbrugh, the head of Shell
in the United Kingdom).
225 See, e.g., Donald Athrop, Hydrogen's Empty Environmental Promise, Cato
Inst. Briefing Paper No. 90, Dec. 7, 2004 (explaining that the main current
source of hydrogen is fossil fuels, and it would take tremendous amounts of
energy to extract hydrogen from water and make the energy available to
consumers as a vehicle fuel).
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immediate investment in a range of short-term strategies,
including energy efficiency improvements, carbon sequestration,
and sharply increased use of renewable energy sources such as
biofuels.226 Others argue that such mitigation steps are a wise
"insurance policy" against possible nonlinearities and surprises in
the climate's response to the increased forcing of rising atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide,227 and that a mitigation strategy has a
highly beneficial cost-benefit ratio.228
With five percent of world population responsible for
emitting 24% of the total carbon dioxide,229 the environmental
inequities of U.S. energy policy are obvious. The United States is
geographically less vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change than many other countries, and it certainly has a large
capacity to bear the costs of adapting to a changed climate in its
agriculture, water supply, indoor climate control, and so forth. Yet,
the U.S. government and the American public at large continue
with business-as-usual, giving scant thought to the responsibility
owed to other nations and peoples, each of whom will feel some
environmental effect from our behavior. British Prime Minister
Tony Blair sees the point clearly: "It is the poorest countries of the
world that will suffer most... yet it is they who have contributed
least to the problem .... [t]hat is why the world's richest nations
in the G8 have a responsibility to lead the way."230
226 See, e.g., Eileen Claussen, An Effective Approach to Climate Change, 306
SCIENCE 816, Oct. 29, 2004.227 See generally infra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
22 William R. Cline, The Costs of Inaction with Respect to Climate Change, Paper
for EPOC High-Level Special Session on the Costs of Inaction, Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Apr. 14, 2005, at 16 (calculating that
delaying abatement by 20 years would cost $7 trillion (in 1990 prices), that is, the
lost benefits of abatement would exceed the costs of abatement by that amount).
229 Tabulation in Wikipedia, based on 2002 data from the the United Nations.
See List of Countries by Carbon Dioxide Emissions, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=List of countriesby-carbondioxide_emissions&oldid=40630248
(last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
230 Mike Peacock, Blair Fears Climate Change Disaster, Challenges US,
REUTERS, Sept. 14, 2004 (quotations omitted), http://www.planetark.com/daily
newsstory.cfm/newsid/27129/story.htm.
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Writing of the divide in the world between rich and poor,
Wolfgang Sachs and his colleagues contend that our "affluence is
secure" only if the poor know nothing about it, accept their poverty
as their fate, or have no chance to attain wealth.23 ' In a globalized
world, they write, none of these conditions exist.232 They quote a
Bangladeshi delegate to a climate change conference in Berlin who
warned his developed country colleagues, "[i]f climate change
makes our country uninhabitable, we will march with our wet feet
into your living-rooms." 233 That brings us back to security, for if the
United States does not act equitably and accept responsibility for
its actions, others are prepared to act against such unfairness and
unresponsiveness. As Sachs notes, peoples and governments of
developing countries see the connection between their circum-
stance and the consumption patterns of developed countries.
Consequently, our patterns of unsustainable consumption help
foster that particular form of insecurity called terrorism.2 34
Terrorism has some of its roots in inequities between the terrorists
and their targets. Inequity here includes unequal distribution of
wealth, but only to the extent that the wealth disparities are
seen to be unfair. Disparities of power and hopelessness about
legitimate means of redress or reform also play an important part.
These arise where the aggrieved party believes that his or her
powerful antagonist lacks sincere regard for the 'other.'235 Dalby
aptly summarizes the implications. "Northern consumption, its
consequences for Southern security, and the shift in focus from
environment to ecology are now fundamental to rethinking
environmental security."
236
231 GREENING, supra note 125, at 167.
232 See id.
233 Id.
234 Although Ferraro, supra note 102, asserts that the link between poverty and
terrorism is "tenuous," id. at 17, he comes to the strong conclusion that "[tihe
real political threat is that the deepening divide between rich and poor states
creates the illusion of separate worlds, one in which genuine cooperation among
states becomes impossible." Id. at 18.
235 GREENING, supra note 125, at 167.
211 Simon Dalby, Security and Ecology in the Age of Globalization,
Environmental Change and Security Program, ECSP REP. 8 (2002), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Report 8_Dalby.pdf.
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The responsibility of the United States and other developed
countries to change consumption behavior to alleviate the security
threat from unsustainable patterns of consumption springs from
both legal and moral sources, not to mention a selfish interest in
our own national security. Legally, a duty is owed to other nations
not to impinge disproportionately on their own environments and
resources and their own security. For sixty years or more, inter-
national law has recognized, as stated in the Rio Declaration:
"States have.., the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States."237 More aspirationally, the preamble to the Earth
Charter declares that the peoples of the world should "decide to live
with a sense of universal responsibility, identifying ourselves with
the whole Earth community as well as our local communities."23
Morally, our responsibility cannot be more eloquently stated
than it was twenty-five years ago in a U.S. government report on
climate change:
Whatever the consequences of the carbon dioxide
experiment for humanity over the long term, our duty
to exercise a conserving and protecting restraint
extends as well to the community of life-animal and
plant-that evolved here with us. There are limits
beyond which we should not go in disrupting or
changing this community of life, which, after all, we
did not create. Although our dominion over the earth
may be near absolute, our right to exercise it is not.239
CONCLUSION
Sustainable development is fundamentally about a com-
bination of economic development to lift the worlds' poorest people
out of the harsh environmental conditions of their daily existence,
237 Rio Declaration, supra note 166, at princ. 2.
238 The Earth Charter Initiative, The Earth Charter, http://www.earthcharter.
orglinnerpg.cfm?idmenu=19.
239 See SPETH, supra note 20 (quoting from a government report by the U.S.
Council on Environmental Quality, GLOBAL ENERGY FUTURES AND THE CARBON
DIOXIDE PROBLEM viii (1981)).
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and environmental protection to ensure that human societies and
their economies can continue to function for the indefinite future.
The WCED underscored the social conditions necessary for a
sustainable world.24 ° In particular, they emphasized the need for
equity-not only intergenerational equity, but more pertinently
the idea of intra-generational equity, thus redressing the drastic
imbalance in the opportunities available to individuals to realize
their dreams and ambitions.24 '
A socially-grounded sustainable development policy, one
that will enhance security for all countries, calls for community-
based development in two senses. First, development should be
founded or centered on ecological communities. In particular,
resource extraction, to the extent that it is appropriate to continue,
should be accompanied by the protection and restoration of
ecological habitats in order to promote conservation of biological
diversity. Second, development initiatives and investments should
center on the sustenance of the human communities that live
within the ecological communities. Only this development pattern
can anticipate and avoid the social and political stresses that give
rise to environmental violence and insecurity. In a very real sense,
sustainable development is about fostering the social conditions for
enduring societies. Protection and maintenance of the environ-
mental resource base is only one of the necessary conditions for
sustainability.
Several times in recent months, the world has been reminded
that unspeakable devastation and loss of life can occur from natural
causes as well as from human violence. Earthquakes and tsunamis
involve natural forces which are almost entirely independent of
human activity; we can only try to warn and assist the survivors in
rebuilding their lives. Hurricane Katrina, other extreme weather
events, and their particular patterns of destruction, on the other
hand, are to some extent influenced by human changes to the
environment. 2 The insecurity that Katrina has left in its wake is
thus an environmental insecurity. The people of Nicaragua and
Honduras know this as well; their individual and national securities
24 See supra notes 96-114 and accompanying text.
241 See discussion supra note 111.
242 See supra note 196.
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have yet to recover fully from Hurricane Mitch a decade ago when
Stan, Wilma, and Beta hit them again in 2005.2"
Ecological politics, itself to some extent an outgrowth of
environmental security analysis, teaches that patterns of security
or insecurity are shaped by a multiplicity of interconnecting socio-
political relationships involving culture, geography, power,
environment, and governance. 2" Like all societies confronting
change in our world, we will adapt to our changing environmental
conditions. How well we make those adaptations will determine
the level of security or insecurity in our lives. For the United
States, we appear to be poised between opting for life in the
splendid isolation of a metaphorical gated community or living
interactively with the world community. However, the security of
a gated community is illusory; we live in a globalized world. As
Jared Diamond conveys in his description of contemporary Los
Angeles, the only effective choice is to embrace the linkage
between sustainable development and our own security, and to
begin the serious work of restructuring our own society and
economy, in cooperation with others around the world, on the basis
of a shared commitment to the whole planet. 245 Addressing a
European audience, Wolfgang Sachs and his colleagues make this
plea most eloquently:
All of this signifies that political and military security,
greater equity of chances of survival, sustainable
economic activity, and protection of the natural
foundations of life are interconnected worldwide.
Anyone seeking sustainability for Germany and
Europe must include the fate of the entire world in
their considerations and actions-out of a sense of
responsibility and self-interest.24 6
24 See U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Honduras, http://www.usaid.gov/location/latin-
americacaribbean/country/honduras; Red Cross, Hurricane Stan: Hondurans
Try to Get Back on Their Feet, Oct. 21, 2005, at http://www.redcross.org/article/
0,1072,0_312_4781,00.html.244 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
245 COLLAPSE, supra note 78, at 499-503.
246 GREENING, supra note 125, at 167-69.
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